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Abstract. The study
** is based on the critical observations that competitive market forces 
alone are not able to assure convergence with the developed countries. These 
observations are grounded on the results of the computation of the marginal rate of 
return to capital (which contradict the neoclassical model hypotheses), as well as on the 
real process of polarisation of the economic activities, taking place worldwide and in 
accordance with the law of competition. Unlike those who trust the perfect competitive 
market virtues, the EU’s economic policy is realistic as it is based on the harmonisation 
of the market forces with an economic policy based on the principle of cohesion, which 
supports, by means of economic levers, the less developed regions and member countries. 
This paper deals with the evolution of the EU cohesion funds, as well as with the results 
of convergence. 
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Economists wonder if real economy convergence can actually be achieved only in a 
competitive market according to the neoclassical models. In this respect, extensive studies and 
models have been conducted. Considering the way the determinants and trends of real 
convergence are approached, the studies and models may be divided into three categories: 
  The first one views real convergence as a natural process, based exclusively on the market 
forces, in accordance with which the convergence process is surer and faster as the market 
is larger, more functional, less distorted.  
  The second one denies that, in the present competitive market, there is an actual real 
convergence between the poor and the rich countries, but accepts the existence of the 
tendency of polarisation or deepening of the divergences and inequalities between the 
centre and the periphery. 
  The third one considers that real convergence is necessary and possible in a competitive 
market, provided that economic policies are implemented to compensate for the negative 
effects of the inequalities or divergences, until the economic systems reach maturity or the 
so-called critical mass to support the self-sufficiency of the real convergence process. 
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Further, we make some critical comments and present some arguments in support of 
the alternatives that are closer to the real needs and opportunities the Romanian economy to 
achieve convergence with the EU real economy. 
1. CONVERGENCE THROUGH THE FUNCTIONAL COMPETITIVE MARKET FORCES 
The first way to perceive real convergence exclusively by the market forces is the 
neoclassical growth theory. Assuming that the economic outcome (GDP per capita) is ensured 
by the contribution of several production factors (capital, labour, natural resources, 
technological progress), the neoclassical model advances the fundamental hypothesis that 
growth depends on the features of the rate of return on capital, which generally tends to 
decrease in relation to the economic growth. For a certain increase in capital, the outcome 
increase is less than proportional. More exactly, at the same saving (investment) rate, the 
marginal rate of return on capital decreases, so that poor countries, with a low amount of 
capital per capita, attain higher rates of return to capital than those of rich countries with a 
considerably higher amount of capital per capita. 
According to the neoclassical model, the higher rate of return on capital achieved by 
the poor countries/regions as against the rich countries/regions (if the other conditions are 
comparable) ensure the long-term convergent economic growth. This postulate is explained 
by many authors (based on the Solow’s model) taking into account the assumption of equal 
saving rates (accumulation), population/employed population growth, capital depreciation, 
technological progress, etc. for all categories of countries. This is the only way that all 
countries, on different initial development levels, may reach the convergence or equilibrium 
state by economic growth rates higher in the poor countries than in the rich ones. 
According to the neoclassical school, many economists consider that the competition 
intensification by the establishment and enlargement of the European internal market and 
integration would have a positive impact and offer opportunities to the countries and regions 
for diminishing the development and per capita income disparities in order to achieve real 
convergence. Only action on a larger scale of the competitive internal market forces in the 
EU, free of any interventionist (protectionist) policy, could guarantee the real convergence of 
the EU countries and regions. 
The free movement of the production factors among the European countries and 
regions, especially through capital market integration and FDI, is an important way to achieve 
real convergence. 
The less developed countries and regions are characterized by capital scarcity and low 
saving capability, due to the low income per capita. This means that those territorial entities 
offer opportunities for development and attract available capital from the countries rich in 
capital, whose companies are eager to penetrate a large safe and profitable market. After the 
accession, the capital inflows as investments increased. Among them, the foreign direct 
investments became the most important means of attracting various intangible resources, such 
as technology, know-how, expertise, managerial experience, etc. Foreign direct investments 
have clearer advantages, if compared with financial investments. But their presence in a 
country or region is dependent on the following requirements: a) sufficient infrastructure of 
high quality; b) low transaction costs (similar to those in agglomerated areas); c) abundant 
and cheap local resources (their low cost may compensate for the additional transaction cost, 
due to the scarce infrastructure); d) possibility to make horizontal investments based on scale 
economies, showing a significant dispersion of the production units among countries and 
regions, as close to the potential clients as possible. 
To make the markets of the new EU countries perfectly compatible and competitive, 
the European Commission implements a systematic policy for the elimination of the non-
competitive elements from the market by banning state aid, protectionist actions and other 
elements that may cause distortions of the single market and national markets.   Real convergence and integration 17 
Moreover, it is quite obvious that many economic reform measures taken by the CEE 
countries as well as the implementation of the Community acquis and the institutional 
improvement are aimed at creating a functional competitive market within every national 
economy and the Community market. 
Some economists and international financial institutions still believe that an enlarged 
and functional market as well as the profound economic integration require the existence of 
strong mechanisms that automatically lead to real convergence, without any policy in support 
of such convergence. The implementation of such policies means, in their opinion, many 
other distortions of the market. 
It is quite obvious that such opinions are expressed by the supporters of the 
neoclassical model, as they think that only the market forces free of any intervention may set 
in motion efficiently the mechanisms that enable the poor countries to recover the delays by 
higher growth rates than those of developed countries. 
Although the reasoning based on the hypothesis of decreasing rate of return and the 
hypothesis of perfect competition is logically correct, facts contradict such opinions. On the 
one hand, poor countries lack the necessary economic, scientific, technological and financial 
power to cope with competition, which explains, to some extent, the reverse trend, that is 
widening the gap (divergence) between the poor and the rich countries, and not diminishing it. 
On the other hand, one should not ignore the overall natural trend of clustering or polarisation 
of the economic activities at different (national, regional or sub-regional) levels, which might 
become a major obstacle to convergence. 
2. THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL SHORTCOMINGS AND NEW APPROACHES 
The empirical research done in the last two decades to check the validity of the 
neoclassical model of convergent growth has not been as relevant as expected. To clarify this 
crucial problem, we intend to check the veracity of the assumption concerning the existence 
of decreasing rate of return on capital, illustrated by the existence or non-existence of the 
correlation between the marginal rate of return of the physical capital (the rate of return of 
investment in physical capital) and the country’s development level (GDP per capita). 
Consequently we consider the following two indicators: 
(i) Rate of return of gross investment in capital (RGI) based on the ratio:  
ΔGDP per capita, representing thr GDP per capita growth in 2004, 
as against the previous year (2003) expressed in PPP – USD 
RGI = The amount of gross investment in capital per capita in 2003 
(ii) Per capita Gross Domestic Product expressed in PPP-USD in 2003. 
Computing these two indicators, on a total number of 180 countries and a number of 
groups of countries at different development level, including the group of the 24 EU member 
countries, and correlating the rate of return with the GDP per capita, the results are presented 
in the graphs in Figures 1-6, in which we noted: on the horizontal, the GDP/capita in 2003 and 
on the vertical, the rate of return of gross investment, for each of the two alternative 
computations. 18   AUREL IANCU 
 
Figure 1: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) by the development level of the economies 
Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
 
Figure 2: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) of the countries with a GDP  
per capita of 550-2500 USD-PPP 
Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
 
Figure 3: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) of the countries  
with a GDP per capita of 2501-7000 USD-PPP Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
Source: Based on UN statistical data.   Real convergence and integration 19 
 
Figure 4: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) of the countries  
with a GDP per capita of 7001-15000 USD-PPP  
Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
 
 
Figure 5: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) of the countries  
with a GDP per capita of 15001- 40000 USD-PPP  
Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
 
Figure 6: The rate of return to the gross investment (RRGI) of the EU member countries  
Source: Based on UN statistical data. 
The graphic presentation in fig. 1-5 do not show any downward trends of the marginal 
rate of returns to capital. The trends are rather constant. The slight downward trend in the EU 
countries (fig. 6) could be explained by the cohesion policy of the EU. 20   AUREL IANCU 
The existence of the increasing or constant rate of return means, according to the 
neoclassical model, a condition towards divergence or widening the gap among countries. 
Some clarifications and explicit analyses (beyond the restrictive postulates required by this 
type of too simplified a model) concerning the definition of the production factors and the 
interpretation of the economic mechanism closer to reality, as a same of convergence or 
divergence, are brought by the endogenous theory. 
Dividing the capital factor into the three components – physical capital, human capital 
and stock of knowledge – and considering that these components do not come from outside, 
but represent accumulations after the input within the system, we may identify which factors 
have additional effects in relation to the input, in what proportion and, finally, which category 
of countries stimulate the factors through the allocated inputs and which factors produce the 
greatest results. 
Rejecting the old hypothesis concerning the decreasing rate of return on capital and 
other unverifiable constraints, the new theory concentrates on types of models able to include 
the effects caused within the system by major production factors – human capital, productive 
knowledge stock, etc. – as well as types of models able to determine the real causes and 
mechanisms of the long-term disparities (using the cross-section analysis or long time series), 
by correlating the growth rate of the production and the per capita income on the national 
or/and regional level with economic, social and political variables which become either the 
engine or the brake of growth. 
The new theory of convergence is based on the operational character of the effects of 
the intangible factors (including the economic policy factors). These effects (called 
“spillovers”) spill over the economy in a special way, that is, over other entities, than their 
direct producers. The effects exceed the input necessary for their production or their 
remuneration amount. 
Usually, the intangible factors (knowledge, professional abilities or skills, information, 
innovation, know-how, etc.) are embodied in tangible production factors, and their outputs are 
spilled over. Spillovers may occur during the investment in physical capital (Arrow, 1962), in 
human capital (Lucas, 1988) or in both types of investment (Romer, 1986). According to 
Romer, if the spillovers are strong, the private marginal product of the physical and human 
capital may stay permanently above the discount rate (Romer, 1986; Thirlwall, 2001). Growth 
may be supported by continuous accumulation (investment), which generates positive 
spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), associated with the formation of the human capital 
(education and training or qualification) and with the Research, development and innovation 
(RD&I), thus preventing the diminution of the rate of return to capital or the increase in the 
capital-output ratio. 
3. DIVERGENCE AND POLARISATION – LASTING EFFECTS OF  
THE COMPETITIVE MARKET FORCES 
The empirical research for testing the validity of the neoclassical model has 
demonstrated that, in most cases, neither the hypothesis concerning the decreasing rate of 
return to capital, nor the real convergence between the poor and the rich countries (regions) is 
confirmed. It is impossible to explain the international discrepancy in the present development 
level only by making reference to the initial difference in factor endowment (Thirlwall, 2001). 
What actually counts is stimulating the development of the new factors (human capital and 
knowledge stock) and their increasing contribution to economic growth, detecting possible 
obstacles to growth in the poor countries and, finally, testing whether the mechanisms causing 
the inequality between the developed countries and the poor ones may last or not. 
The theoretical contribution made by Perroux, Myrdal, Prebisch, etc. has changed the 
way of explaining real convergence and decisively influenced the direction of the economic   Real convergence and integration 21 
policy for the European construction, beginning with the drafting of the Rome Treaty
1. 
Although not always analytically rigorous, the new economic notions included in the 
scientific circuit, such as attraction poles, clusters, centre-periphery, flows of complementary 
factors, positive spillovers, etc., have broadened the horizon of the debates and the 
understanding of the processes taking place in the real economy, and the research area 
concerning the economic policy. 
The above notions and the concept of circular cumulative cause of the economic 
processes help us explain the increasing international difference in the development level as 
against the similar initial conditions
2. The movement of capital, the human capital and labour 
migration, the goods and services exchange perpetuate and even worsen international and 
regional development inequalities. By means of the free trade mechanisms (i.e., free of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers), the less developed countries, which lack the human capital and the 
scientific and technological capability, have to specialize in the production of mostly primary 
goods characterized by an inelastic or almost inelastic demand in relation to price and income. 
What causes the increasing inequality between countries is the tendency of 
interregional and international polarisation (agglomeration), especially in the context of the 
economic and monetary integration. As there are no barriers to the movement of goods, 
services and production factors, some countries and regions form strong poles of attraction 
and cause imbalances between countries showing important differences in the income per 
capita. The developed countries and regions endowed with factors become poles of attraction 
that absorb increasing amounts of high quality labour and capital from the less developed 
countries. 
Even if during the accession process the countries make major efforts to support the 
economic and institutional reforms and attempts to achieve a stable development equilibrium, 
in real life there is a natural trend with an universal character towards the polarisation of the 
processes, which in turn causes the broadening of the gap between the development levels of 
the countries and regions. Myrdal claims that the economic and social forces alike tend 
towards equilibrium and that the economic theory hypotheses according to which 
disequilibrium situations tend towards equilibrium are false (Myrdal, 1957; Thirlwall, 2001). 
If it were not true, then how could one explain the international differences in the standard of 
living? Unable to answer this question, Myrdal replaces the stable equilibrium hypothesis 
with what he calls the circular cumulative causation hypothesis or, briefly speaking, the 
cumulative causation hypothesis. This hypothesis helps us explain why the international and 
interregional differences in the development level may persist and increase in time. 
Myrdal’s hypothesis is based on a multiplier-accelerator mechanism, which causes the 
income to rise at higher rates in the so-called favoured - more developed - countries and 
regions, which are endowed with modern infrastructure, gain scientific and technological 
ascendancy and enjoy physical and human capital inflows, as well as scientific and 
technological inflows; consequently, they become more attractive for their capital and labour 
than the less developed areas. The free trade in goods and services and the full freedom of 
movement of the production factors among countries and regions showing great differences in 
the development level causes increasing polarisation: on the one hand, countries and regions 
that become richer, enjoy a significant economic growth and show attractiveness to the high-
skilled production factors and, on the other hand, countries and regions characterized by 
stagnation and economic decline, obsolete and non-attractive infrastructure, decreasing 
income and taxation levels, that is, limited demand for goods and services. 
Under these circumstances, there cannot be any economic convergence. The 
approaches and analyses initiated by Myrdal, Prebisch, Seers, etc. have led to an influent 
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trend, based on the concept of divergence, which points out the process of polarisation and the 
divergence between the centre and the periphery. 
This trend of thought brings influence to bear upon the following levels: 
  the practical one, reflected in the European construction projects by the adoption of some 
tools of the European economic policy;  
  the analytical one, strongly reflected in two directions:  
o  re-thinking the construction and interpretation of economic growth, by returning to the 
economic and social realities (it concerns the development of endogenous models and 
the econometric testing);  
o  new approaches to the geographic (regional) economy, taking into account real 
processes, such as: regional disparities, development agglomerations or poles, role of 
infrastructure, transaction costs. 
4. COHESION – AN IMPORTANT TOOL IN SUPPORT OF  
THE REAL CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE EU 
The chance that the poor national economies advance towards convergence within an 
enlarged and highly competitive single market is illusory. There are some mechanisms that 
rather stimulate divergence. But there are some other ones that may produce positive effects 
on the long-term convergence processes, although their success is rather uncertain in the 
absence of economic policies to support them and to prevent the negative effects. Among the 
most important mechanisms mentioned by Pelkmans and pointed out by us, one may find the 
following: 
  the intraindustrial specialisation of the less developed countries on parts of products and 
operations, in accordance with the comparative advantage principle, for the capitalisation 
of the available national (local) resources at small costs;  
  the integration of the less developed countries into the EU makes them more attractive to 
foreign capital, and, first, to foreign direct investments, initially within the existing 
economic clusters and then extended gradually to the periphery territories, along with the 
infrastructure extension;  
  the strengthening of the competition to which the products, services, factors and 
companies from the less developed countries are exposed as the countries accede to the 
EU, which eliminates the non-competitive local activities and causes dramatic social 
problems, while such activities are taken over by viable competitive companies;  
  the integration into a large single market in accordance with the Community acquis 
eliminates the distortions and the obstacles to development, but does not always stimulate 
the development of the poor countries and regions. 
The impact of the integration on economic growth, in the absence of cohesion policies, 
does not ensure that the poor countries will reach higher GDP per capita growth rates than the 
more developed countries, to enable convergence. Unlocking convergence mechanisms by 
cohesion policies has become one of the EU’s major objectives. 
When the Rome Treaty stipulated that “the harmonious development of the economic 
activities” and “the continuous and balanced expansion” are the first two economic objectives, 
both the structural divergence and the difference in income per capita between the backward 
and the advanced members of the Common Market were taken into consideration. To achieve 
the real convergence in both cases, the Treaty was based implicitly and exclusively on the 
market mechanisms. 
Considering the scarcity of market mechanisms for the recovery of the poor countries 
and regions, the EU has gradually gained tasks concerning cohesion and solidarity in order to 
facilitate real convergence by improving the economic performance. The adoption of the 
cohesion principle was mostly determined by the accession of the countries with a GDP per 
capita much below the EU average (Greece, Portugal and the CEE countries). The cohesion   Real convergence and integration 23 
principle, applied by means of specific tools, is largely used to diminish the disparities in the 
GDP per capita between countries and regions by improving their performance. 
The most important step taken to adopt the principles of cohesion and harmonious 
development was the explicit inclusion of three economic objectives concerning convergence 
in the Maastricht Treaty: (1) harmonious and sustainable development of the economic 
activities; (2) high level of convergence of the economic performance; (3) economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity of the member states. The objectives (concerning the real 
convergence of the economic performance through cohesion) were included in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, with some formal modifications. To apply the above-mentioned principle, 
two important categories of EU funds were created: structural funds and cohesion funds. 
The structural funds are mostly directed to the EU regions with a GDP per capita 
below 75% of the EU average. The funds are provided: to support the development of the 
infrastructure in the backward regions; to develop human resources, mainly by training; to 
enable the private sector development. 
The cohesion fund provides support for the EU member countries (with a GDP per 
capita under 90% of the EU-15 average) to meet the requirements for the European Single 
Market and the transition to the EMU. Until 2006, cohesion funds were granted to Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Afterwards, between 2004 and 2006 the countries which joined 
the EU in 2004 received the total amount of 8.495 billion euros, out of which Poland received 
almost half3. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the countries receiving cohesion funds. 
These funds are used to finance directly individual projects on transport infrastructure and 
environment, provided that they are clearly identified
4. 
The amount provided for the Cohesion Fund increased at a fast pace (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Evolution of the Cohesion Fund, 1975-2013 
Year Mil.  ECU/euro  Share in EU budget, % 
1975 257  (ECU)  4.8 
1981  1 540 (ECU)  7.3 
1987  3 311 (ECU)  9.1 
1992 18  557  (ECU)  25.0 
1998 33  461  (ECU)  37.0 
2002 (incl. pre-accession assistance) 34  615  (euros)  35.0 
2006 UE-25
* 38 791 (euros)  32.0 
2013 UE-27
* 50 960 (euros)  32.0 
Source: Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, Elaborarea politicilor în Uniunea Europeană 
(translation into Romanian of the Policy-making of EU), Ediţia a cincea, Institutul European din  
România, 2005, p. 205. 
The most important transfers to the cohesion countries (in 1989-1999) were the 
following: Greece received an amount equivalent to 3.5% of the GDP, Portugal 3.3%, Ireland 
2.4% and Spain 1.5%5. 
In 2007-2013, the resources allocated to the cohesion policy (received by the countries 
with a GDP per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average) will amount to 336.1 billion euros, 
that is, one-third of the EU total budget and about 4% of the EU GDP. To these resources one 
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should add the structural funds (competitiveness for growth and employment) of 132.77 
billion euros, as well as the funds for the preservation and management of the natural resurses 
of 404.77 billion euros, of which: 301.06 billion euros for agriculture (market expenditure and 
direct payment). 
Since the main objective is the promotion of the development projects in the backward 
countries and regions, the structural and cohesion funds are essential operational tools that 
spread the new poles of attraction in order to extend viable businesses to new areas of the 
recipient cohesion countries by the development of both the physical (tangible) infrastructure 
and the intangible one, pertaining to the information, training (qualification), knowledge and 
innovation fields. 
5. EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE NEED FOR COHESION POLICIES AND SOME 
ASSESSMENT OF THE REAL CONVERGENCE 
Although the development level of the country’s real economy is not a condition for 
the accession to the EU or a negotiation issue for the accession, the question of catching-up or 
bridging the gaps between the EU member countries and regions is an important and urgent 
topic for the economic, scientific and technological strategy of the EU. The issue is important 
because there are major disparities in the economic development levels of the EU countries 
and regions. The disparities widened after the accession of the two waves of CEE countries. 
For example, while in 2000 the ratio of the lowest GDP per capita of a EU-15 member 
country to the average GDP per capita of the EU-15 was 66%, in 2005, after the accession of 
the ten countries, the ratio of the lowest GDP per capita to the average GDP per capita of the 
EU-25 reached 46.6%. After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the lowest GDP per 
capita as against the EU-25 average reached 32%. 
The persistence of the disparities and underdevelopment of some EU countries and 
regions would mean the inconsistency with the very meaning of the European Communities 
and with the EU strategy, according to which the EU is supposed to become the most 
important economic and technological power in the world in a predictable period of time, to 
become the global leader in the economic, scientific, technological and living standard areas. 
Of course, such a strategy prevents the persistence of disparities and the existence of 
underdeveloped and poor regions and, also, requires the implementation of policies fully 
aimed at capitalising the resources of all component countries and regions to achieve their 
economic and social development. That is why, the EU adopted a firm policy on economic 
and social cohesion, in order to achieve the real economic convergence of all member 
countries and regions. From this perspective, it is worth mentioning that all twelve countries 
of the two accession waves have become cohesion countries, since their GDP per capita has 
been far below the threshold of 90% of the EU average. Therefore, all these countries satisfy 
the basic criterion for becoming beneficiaries of the Cohesion Fund for the infrastructure and 
environment projects. Also, most regions of these countries are eligible for financing from the 
Structural Funds, since their GDP per capita is below the threshold of 75% of the EU-25 
average. 
The new member countries have received economic support from the EU since the 
pre-accession period through special lead-up programmes (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, etc.). In 
the post-accession period, the financial support offered through the new programmes is more 
consistent as regards the objectives and implementation mechanisms, as well as the size of the 
funds allocated from the EU multiannual budget (2007-2013). The question “To what extent 
did these policies influence the real economy convergence?” is difficult to answer by 
analytical impact assessments, since these policies have not yet produced effects, due to the 
relatively short time of application. 
The clarifying elements in this matter are the overall results of the influence of all 
factors of convergent growth in each country, determined by means of different factors 
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between the set of analysed economies (the evolution of the index concerning the ratio 
between the level indicators of the economies, dispersion, Gini index, Theil index, etc.), or the 
cross-section convergence (β-convergence), or, finally, the convergence of the time series, 
dynamic distribution, etc.
6. We confine ourselves in this study to the results of the 
computation of two of the above indicators, which are equally simple and suggestive 
(i) The index concerning the ratio between the level indicators (GDP per capita). 
Relating the level of the GDP per capita of the countries to the average level of the EU for a 
certain period, one may find general trend of approximation of the development levels of 
these countries as against the EU average level in the analysed period. Table 2 contains data 
on the cohesion countries pertaining to the EU-15 Group (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and the 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
Table 2 
The evolution of the index concerning the ratio of the GDP per capita of  
the cohesion countries and to the EU-25 average, based on PPP* (1998-2005), percentage 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Greece 70.4 70.7 72.6 73.5 77.2 81.1 81.9 83.0 
Spain    88.8 92.5 92.5 93.2 95.3 97.7 97.3 98.3 
Portugal    78.2 80.3 80.6 79.8 79.53  72.8 72.2 70.9 
Czech  R.  65.3 64.9 63.7 64.9 66.5 67.7 70.04  73.07 
Estonia    39.1 38.8 40.7 42.3 45.1 48.4 51.1 55.5 
Cyprus    79.3 80.3 81.1 83.1 82.3 80.2 82.3 82.5 
Latvia   32.9 34.0 35.3 37.0 38.6 41.0 42.7 46.6 
Lithuania  38.5 37.2 38.3 40.3 41.9 45.1 47.6 50.9 
Hungary    50.8 51.6 52.7 55.7 58.1 59.4 59.9 61.2 
Malta   76.5 77.1 77.6 74.0 74.4 72.8 69.1 69.2 
Poland 44.7 45.7 46.7 46.2 46.5 47.0 48.9 49.5 
Slovakia    46.9 46.8 47.2 48.6 51.1 52  52.9 55.1 
Slovenia    71.5 73.9 72.6 74.0 74.4 76  78.9 80.7 
Bulgaria   26.2  26.3  26.7  28.3 28.6 29.6 30.4 32.0 
Romania    26.5 25.6 25.1 26.5 28.5 28.5 32.1 32.9 
* Purchasing Power Parity. 
Source: Based on Eurostat data. 
We have related the GDP per capita of each country to the average GDP per capita, 
computed for 25 countries, although the official computation for the previous financial years 
was based on the GDP per capita of the cohesion countries related to the average GDP per 
capita of the EU-15. 
The evolution described by the data presented in Table 2 reveals a general trend of 
approximation to the average index (denoted by 100%) in all cohesion countries. Of course, 
the evolution of the indices computed for each country reveals the convergence of the real 
national economies during the pre-accession and post-accession to the EU. 
(ii) The variation coefficient of the GDP per capita or the σ-convergence. Frequently 
used in the economic analysis, the indicator expresses the convergence level as a result of the 
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The indicator computation is based on cross-section statistical series (countries), when 
comparisons in a time sequence are made, and time series (discrete time interval, t and t + T), 
in order to characterize the evolution (trend) of convergence. When the dispersion decreases 
in a certain period of time (when the value of the variation coefficient diminishes), 
convergence  t T t+ σ < σ  takes place. 
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To characterize the level and evolution of the real convergence process of the EU 
national economies, we computed the variation coefficient separately, for two groups of 
countries, EU-25 and EU-10 (the countries which joined the EU in 2004) and for the two 
alternatives of the GDP per capita expressed in euros: the purchasing power parity (euros-
PPP) and market exchange rate (euros). The series cover the period between 1995-2006. 
The results of the computation concerning the evolution of the variation coefficient (σ-
convergence) are presented in a numerical form in Table 3, in accordance with above 
alternatives. 
Table 3 
The numerical evolution of the σ-convergence  
(the per capita GDP variation coefficient), EU-25 and EU-10 
Years  Calculation based on PPP  Calculation based on exchange rate 
  EU 25  EU 10  EU 25  EU 10 
1995 0.44  ....  0.71  .... 
1996 0.43  ....  0.68  .... 
1997 0.42  ....  0.65  .... 
1998  0.41 0.35 0.64  0.81 
1999  0.44 0.36 0.66  0.86 
2000  0.44 0.34 0.65  0.77 
2001  0.42 0.33 0.63  0.67 
2002  0.42 0.31 0.63  0.66 
2003  0.43 0.28 0.63  0.69 
2004  0.43 0.27 0.63  0.64 
2005  0.42 0.24 0.62  0.55 
2006
* 0.42 0.24 0.62  0.51 
*Estimated data. 
Source: Based on Eurostat data. 
The evolution of the variation coefficients (σ-convergence) computed for the two 


























































Figure 7: σ-convergence (variation coefficient) computed on the basis of the per capita GDP (PPP, euro) 
Source: Based on Eurostat data. 
From the analysis of the level and tendency of the variation coefficients computed for 
the above alternatives, we draw the following conclusions: 
In the case of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, the lower level of the 
variation coefficient means a higher convergence level in relation to the whole of the EU 
member countries. 
The downward trend of the variation coefficient for both alternatives (PPP and 
exchange rate), more discernible with the 10 countries as against all countries, shows a higher 
rate of real convergence in this group of countries. 
The variation coefficients based on the market exchange rate in the group of ten 
countries are higher – over two times – than those based on the PPP, which means that the   Real convergence and integration 27 
difference among the countries of this group in the standard of living is relatively low and, 
consequently, the convergence level of these countries expressed in real terms is much higher 
than that expressed in nominal terms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the wide gap between Romania and the developed countries and the 
complexity of the problem as such, the issue of real convergence should be paid special 
attention. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, within the theoretical and empirical research 
in the field, real convergence is the crucial point of the economic growth and enables the 
researcher to set the objectives, resources and mechanisms; also, it signals the transition of the 
countries from the periphery (poor) group to the rich one. 
To examine the question of the real convergence from different angles, two classes of 
models have been designed and used: neoclassical and endogenous. In our study we tried to 
show the limitations of the neoclassical model and, especially, the failure of the assumption 
concerning the decreasing rate of return on capital. Finding ourselves in opposition to this 
kind of model, in this study we present the most important features of the endogenous growth 
model (and derived models) and its capability to include and/or consider the real convergence 
(divergence) factors. 
The latest empirical research aimed at the validation of various convergence 
hypotheses proves that there is not and it cannot be an alignment of all countries with an 
“absolute convergence”. What the economic and social reality of the countries and regions 
confirm is rather the “group convergence”, viewed in its dynamics and in relation to the 
factors of influence acting within the system. Under the present circumstances, the factor that 
determines the dynamics of the developed countries is knowledge, in its multiple forms. The 
knowledge factor determines the higher growth rates of the developed countries, if compared 
to the poor ones. 
As pointed out above, market mechanisms are not able to support the convergence 
process, especially when there is a wider gap in the development level of the countries and 
regions. On the contrary, the mechanism stimulates, first, the economic clustering, the 
formation of development poles, which rather cause wider gaps. Considering these natural 
processes, the European Union tries to correct the shortcomings of the free market laws by the 
cohesion policy, besides the sectoral policies, with favourable effects on the economic 
convergence of the less developed countries with the developed ones. 
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